

NERIS Working Group on Contaminated Goods

‘ConGoo’ 1st Meeting

Paris, 25-26 October 2012

Meeting Minutes (DRAFT)

1. INTRODUCTION

The meeting is open by *Sylvie Charron*, who welcomes the participants. She asks *Thierry Schneider*, NERIS Secretariat, to present NERIS. He announces that NERIS has been declared as a self-sustainable non-for-profit organization, under the French Law, since September this year. This will give new opportunities to NERIS Members (43 organisations in 26 countries) for answering collectively to future calls for projects. The working group on ‘contaminated goods’ was created at the occasion of the NERIS General Assembly in Glasgow, last May. This working group is a very good opportunity to anticipate and design the future activities to be performed within the work package no3 (‘management of contaminated consumer goods’) of the ‘PREPARE’ FP7 EC Project to which NERIS Members will contribute in 2013-2015. *Sylvie Charron* confirms that this work package will be leaded by IRSN, the French Institute of Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, that also hosts this first NERIS working group meeting on the same topic: the management of contaminated goods (response and preparedness).

(Self-presentation of participants:) seventeen participants from eight countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom) and the Nuclear Agency of the OECD participate to the meeting. All organisations (IRSN, CEPN, RPII, SCK•CEN, HPA, NRPA, GAEC, SFOPH, RIVM, UMB) that will also participate to the ‘PREPARE’ WP3 are represented but CIEMAT, UPM, RIKILT and STUK from which apologies for absence have been received, and as such the case from the IAEA, the FAO and the EC (DG-ENER).

The programme of the meeting (see hereafter) is composed of 9 topical presentations covering the national approaches for managing both contaminated foodstuff and other commodities after an accident (e.g. *Chernobyl*, *Fukushima*) or proposals for new strategies and methodologies in case of a future accident that would affect Europe.

All the presentations will be made available on the NERIS website, soon. In the meantime, they can be downloaded from the following *SkyDrive*® online file-storage address: <http://sdrv.ms/P80e4N>

2. TOPICAL PRESENTATIONS KEY POINTS

2.1. IRSN Working Group on foodstuffs

Jean-François Lecomte (IRSN, France) presented the issue of contaminated foodstuffs after an emergency and the many questions raised. He notably mentioned that MPLs (Maximum Permitted Levels) are not harmonized at the international level and this has led to real inconsistencies for the managing and controlling the products import from Japan after the Fukushima accident.

He situated the issue of foodstuffs in the ICRP system (types and categories of exposure, principles, reference levels, etc.). He reminds that once the emergency phase is over, a post-accidental situation must be managed as an existing exposure situation: the main principle to be applied is optimization i.e. by reducing public exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) below (or even sometimes above) reference levels, economic and societal aspects being taken into account.

He also presented the first reflections of a topical IRSN working group which proposes a graded approach according to space and time (nearby area versus international trade). It is a very complex and sensitive issue that cannot be solved without taking into account different viewpoints both at national and international levels, and without a strong involvement of stakeholders (consumers, producers, processing and retail industries representatives, health and radiological safety authorities, RP experts). The general idea is to propose a quality improvement strategy based on solidarity, transparency and compromise (see slides #8,9 and 10). The post-Chernobyl and post-Fukushima experiences are of prior importance in this need for improving the existing approaches.

He pointed that, although 'numbers' are useful, there is a crucial need to determine their rationale before setting the numerical values. This rationale should be known and shared by (all) stakeholders. He also pleaded for a kind of flexibility in order to be able to adapt the numbers to the actual situation, especially in the nearby area. In difficult situations, for which many concerned parties with different points of view and interests are involved, the cornerstone is probably more the strategy than the numbers.

The first reflections of IRSN are an input for engaging a reflection at the European level to build a comprehensive system for the management of contaminated foodstuffs, which should be thought in coherence with the recent ICRP framework and recommendations no.103, no.109 and no.111 as well as the future European (EC) and International (IAEA) Basic Safety Standards and the possible evolution of the FAO/WHO *Codex Alimentarius*. The system must encompass foodstuff, feedstuff and other commodities.

2.2. The CRPPH Group on Trade in Commodities and Food

Ted Lazo (OECD-NEA) mentions that the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH), agreed in March 2012 that an important question arising from the Fukushima accident was the difficulty in using radiological protection criteria for the import and export of commodities and food. While numerous internationally agreed approaches and values exist (e.g. Codex Alimentarius, BSS exemption values, IAEA transport values, EC post-Chernobyl emergency values, etc.) some level of confusion arose following the Fukushima accident. As a result, the CRPPH agreed that this was an area that could be usefully explored, and assigned this task to its Expert Group on the Radiological Protection Aspects of the Fukushima Accident (EGRPF). Ted Lazo presents the first elements of reflection of its Sub-Group on Trade in Commodities and Food (TCF).

The CRPPH-EGRPF-TCF Subgroup proposes a framework both for foodstuff and other commodities, during an emergency situation and after (i.e. existing exposure situation).

The steering principle for establishing criteria for foodstuff export is the difficulty for national governments in an accident country to justify the use of different criteria for its own population and for populations in other countries, as well as in accident-affected areas as compared to its own population outside of affected areas: the chosen criteria for the commercialisation of food should be based on the long-term protection of populations living in those areas directly affected by the accident (i.e. 'the most exposed group' of population).

- During an emergency, consumption and trade of food produced in affected or potentially affected areas should be restricted as soon as possible, and continue until the accident situation is under control and no further releases are expected, until capabilities are put in place to monitor foods, and until the extent and concentrations of contamination are well understood.
- After the emergency, food marketability criteria (e.g. for long-term consumption in affected and unaffected areas, and for international trade) - Bq/kg, Bq/L - should be based on assuring that those living in affected areas would not exceed 1 mSv of internal exposure in a year (emergency exposure not being taken into account).

For other goods and commodities (i.e. excluding foodstuff) the subgroup proposes that for each accident, a specific assessment of products being shipped from the affected territory should be carried out, and specific criteria (in operational units such as Bq/kg, Bq/L, Bq/cm², etc.) should be developed case by case (i.e. according to potential realistic exposure scenarios).

- During an emergency, the exportation of items coming from potentially affected areas should be restricted (from trade bans to trade restrictions) as soon as possible and continue until the accident situation is under control (see above).
- After the emergency the consumer products and commodities marketability criteria (e.g. for long-term use in affected and unaffected areas, and for international trade) should assure that exposures to those most affected (to be assessed on a case-by-case basis) would be less than 1 mSv in a year (emergency exposure not being taken into account).

The CRPPH Expert Group on the Radiological Aspects of the Fukushima Accident (EGRPF) will review these draft recommendations. The EGRPF will forward the results of its review to the CRPPH for consideration. The CRPPH will discuss the EGRPF report at its next meeting, 14 – 16 May 2013.

2.3. Norwegian strategies towards permissible levels in foods and feed

Lavrans Skuterud (NRPA, Norway) presents the post Chernobyl strategy, which is still active in Norway - 26 years after the accident! - but not changed since mid-1990s. Although Norway is very far from Chernobyl (~2,000 km), it is probably one of the most affected countries in the world (after Belarus, Ukraine and Russia). It has affected the reindeer biota for decades and Sámi reindeer herders felt their whole existence was endangered.

The Norwegian authorities were lead to establish MPLs (for reindeer meat, and freshwater fish) far above other European MPLs (for beef meat or sea fish) in order to maintain a meaningful business base for reindeer herders and Sámi life-style in central Norway. In some cases (e.g. for the high quantity consumers), this required additional actions of protection, specific information (leaflets), regular individual monitoring (whole body counting), control and surveillance by authorities (measurements before the animal slaughtering), etc.

The Norwegian authorities are in the process of developing a new overall strategy for emergency preparedness and management of radioactivity in foods and feed. They do envisage a reduction of the present MPL of 3,000 Bq/kg for reindeer meat, balancing the corresponding expected reduction of collective doses with the cost increase. New approaches to avoid or reduce animal contamination, radioecology considerations (e.g. differences between Southern and Central

Norway), doses to high quantity consumers, possible evolution of the market, and monitoring capabilities and protocols, are examples of other criteria that will be taken into account when developing a more general strategy.

2.4. Monitoring of radioactivity in goods, experience from Greece

Vassiliki Kamenopoulou (GAEC, Greece) presents the Greek mechanisms for routine and post-accidental radioactivity monitoring in goods.

She mentions that in case of an emergency (in Greece or abroad) the Greek Atomic Energy Commission is in charge of the activation of the Emergency Response Plan. There are two plans, one dealing with nuclear accidents (outside the country) and a second dealing with CBRN threats. In any case, coordination of an important monitoring laboratories network including environmental radioactivity laboratories from Universities and research centers around the country. If needed, custom offices, border guards, Hellenic coast guards, etc are also activated. The announcement and diffusion of the monitoring results after an accident is coordinated by GAEC.

For example, during the Fukushima accident, the only radionuclide sparsely detected on the imported food and feeding stuffs was the ^{131}I but at very low levels of concentration (negligible from the radiation protection point of view).

The coordination among involved bodies in the past, and recently, during Fukushima nuclear crisis was quite efficient. However, the Fukushima crisis has also shown the importance of pre-engaging (before an accident occurs) a dialogue with stakeholders, especially with shipping companies, harbour authorities and custom offices in Greece (which is the linchpin of the European shipping market).

2.5. Previous experience with stakeholder panels and an outlook on consumer issues

Geert Olyslaegers (SCK•CEN, Belgium) – in the absence of Catrinel Turcanu – presents the Belgian experience with stakeholder panels (at the occasion of FARMING and EURANOS projects), and the previous SCK•CEN research on public acceptance. The summary is made on the second topic only.

SCK•CEN has established a ‘risk perception barometer’ in 2009 (after the INES-3 event in Fleurus that occurred in August 2008).

The consumer’s attitude towards meat with radioactive contamination below legal norms shows the complexity of such situations: if 68% agree that a food product complying with legal norms can be safely consumed, only 30% agree buying and consuming it. As an average, 48% of consumers would disagree or strongly disagree to buy meat and consume it as usual in the first few months after the accident. But, in the vicinity of the accident, this number raises to 56% (and the first one - acceptance - falls down to less than 15%).

In general, it is observed that the perception in affected areas differs from that of the general population. However, the most sensitive topic deals with the consumption of foods for which trust does not mean willingness to buy. The perception of consumers is rather different than the perception of producers (a Japanese farmer’s testimony illustrates this clearly: « *I couldn't sleep. I was so worried. We came back after a week. Even though the radiation was frightening, when we saw the cows again we had peace of mind* »).


The general behaviour would probably lead to a sustainable boycott of the products coming from an affected area (if it does not concern a vital product and/or if alternatives are maintained available).

2.6. Food contamination – risk assessment and crisis communication

Ciara McMahon (RPII, Ireland) focus also on the risk perception and public attitudes toward risk in according to the authorities' response. She develops the lessons learned from two different (in terms of management) dioxin crises, 9 years apart. She points out - the importance of the prompt communication to the public, - the need to confess the existence of uncertainties especially with regard to risk assessment and potential long-term consequences, - the control of stigma by providing detailed (but understandable) information to the public, and by explaining protective countermeasures, - the availability and presence of experts in media during the crisis and after it.

Some lessons learned:

- Plan for range of scenarios – including low probability/high consequence events
- Include all relevant bodies
- Think realistic 'worst case' – better to relax a ban than have to extend it
- Keep neighbouring countries fully informed
- Assist international organisations in their risk assessments
- Where possible use internationally agreed limits



2.7. Contaminated goods (non food) during Fukushima

Chris Twenhöfel (RIVM, The Netherlands) focused his presentation on the Dutch experience with contaminated imports of commodities (i.e. non foodstuff) after Fukushima and presents the forthcoming Dutch 'Exemption Project'.

The major concern in the Netherlands dealt with the import of Japanese commodities and their arrival at the Rotterdam harbour and the Schiphol airport. The only available criteria were those established for transport arrangements (packages), and from the detection gates at the harbour.

Chris Twenhöfel presents the specific protocols of control that have been adopted in the port of Rotterdam for containers on board.

It must be recognized that even if the consequences of the Fukushima accident were quite small in terms of number of containers/airplanes monitored above the adopted screening criteria, there appeared not much European guidance for regulation for the import of potentially contaminated non-food items. This has led to the launching of the 'Exemption' project aimed at – making an inventory of existing standards (IAEA, EU), – defining exposure scenarios and model doses for population and workers (taking into account all exposure pathways), – reviewing cleanup efficiencies, and – developing an assessment framework for contaminated objects.

According to different scenarios, the potential exposures are calculated from the surface contamination of goods and products (SURface DOse Quantification: 'SUDOQU'). The process has been tested successfully; however, difficulties remain such as - the surface contamination which is poorly specified; - the use of different levels for goods and packages; - the huge range of realistic high-probability/unrealistic low-probability exposure; - the non-harmonization of surface contamination criteria at the European level; etc.

2.8. Issues and regulatory implications in dealing with radioactively contaminated goods (excluding foodstuff) imported into the UK

Tiberio Cabianca (HPA, United Kingdom) presents HPA experience with regard to radioactively contaminated goods (excluding foodstuff) imported into the UK (goods contaminated with Chernobyl and Fukushima fallouts). It shows that the present criteria to detect radioactivity are not well adapted to manage existing exposure post-accidental situations. They have been established for normal transport, waste management (clearance/exemption) or security reasons and they are, most of the time, not radionuclide specific. However, transport regulations are solely concerned with ensuring that goods can circulate.

HPA has worked with UK regulator (ONR-RMT) and IAEA to develop method to calculate radionuclide specific values for surface contamination to replace current values, but IAEA TRANSSC did not accept changes. HPA also developed software for this purpose. Method and software were used for Fukushima. HPA method is based on transport scenarios, not use of contaminated goods. The dose corresponding to the use is not assessed.

Moreover, different regulatory authorities (ONR-RMT, EA, HSE) are involved in UK when dealing with radioactively contaminated goods and the radiation protection criteria that these used may differ: communications between regulatory authorities is not always timely. It is necessary to provide a common guidance between different organisations to deal with contaminated goods, even at the national (UK) level. In that perspective, HPA could provide technical support.

2.9. Contaminated goods: experience from Switzerland

Christophe Murith (SFOPH, Switzerland) presents the current legislation in Switzerland which, at the moment, consider two levels for contaminated foodstuff:

- The limit is the maximum concentration beyond which the food is considered unsuitable for human consumption (health criteria)
- The tolerance value, which is the maximum level beyond which the foodstuff is considered altered or otherwise reduced in its intrinsic value (quality criteria, with no risk to health)

The tolerance values are below (by a factor 10 to 100), than the Codex Alimentarius values considered as limits. At the level of Codex, the corresponding adults and infants effective doses received the first year after a major event of contamination, would be generally below 1 mSv . The Codex Alimentarius apply only in emergency situations and there are no guidance levels for other situations, especially existing exposure situations. It is clear that the societal aspects will have a huge importance in that field, especially if baby food could be impacted. People will not accept to eat food with the Codex value (e.g. 1'000 Bq/kg Cs-137), but will accept to buy food below 10 Bq/kg Cs-137 (actual tolerance value in Switzerland). So we need not only a value for food according to trade in an emergency situation but also for managing food in the existing post-accidental situation "normal situation" after emergency. This value must be lower than the one applying in emergency.

Christophe Murith proposes to envisage new figures considering that, in a contaminated area, almost 100% of the foodstuff could be contaminated (which means that criteria for existing exposure situations could be 10 times below the present *Codex Alimentarius* values; if needed, tolerance values could be set about 100 times below them). However, in Switzerland, the feedback experience from the Chernobyl accident shows that the societal concerns are more

important than existing or non-existing numbers. The most important issues are: - the existence and capacity to mobilize decentralized laboratories to perform sampling and measurements (such as in-situ spectrometry); - the prioritization of RP countermeasures toward the most vulnerable groups of population (children, pregnant women); the quick bans and restrictions (e.g. fishing); - the national/local communication (both with the public and between involved parties) – strategy. During Fukushima, the public appreciated the SFOPH hotline. However it was still chaotic with regard to the criteria to adopt for different types of recommendations: tourism/business travelling, iodine tablets distribution (in Japan), support of Swiss companies and people living in Asia, imports of goods and foods (border controls), etc.

As a conclusion, the use of food (and other goods) is a very sensitive issue for the public. If this problem is not solved (both in terms of strategy and quantitative criteria) well in advance, it will reveal a real failure in the post-accidental preparedness and generate an irreversible loss of trust.

Two other papers, not planed in the initial agenda, were shortly presented during the meeting:

2.10. Control of health products after the Fukushima accident

Alain Rannou (IRSN, France) presents the protocol established in France for controlling the health products within the enterprises after the Fukushima accident. The methodology addresses both incoming products (including packaging/raw materials/finished products) and outgoing products (drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, 'other products'). On the one hand controls of all incoming products as well as medical devices and 'other outgoing products' should be based on dose rate measurements with a criteria fixed at two times the background; on the other hand controls of drugs and cosmetics should be based on activity measurements, the criteria being the Maximum Permitted Levels of foodstuffs for drugs and zero activity for cosmetics. Controls of incoming products should be random or systematic according to their Japanese origin (prefecture) whereas controls of outgoing products should be random or systematic according to the transformation process.

The implementation of these controls remained under the full responsibility of the enterprises.

Alain Rannou concluded by stressing that there is not yet an international standard for the control of contaminated goods following a nuclear accident. This issue has been addressed within the ISO/TC 85/SC 2 'Radiological Protection' and the contribution of everyone to the project of SC2 in this field is very welcomed.

2.11. Heavy metals in Norwegian salmon

Yevguenia Tomkiv (UMB, Norway) presents the economical crisis (2005-2007) that follows the Russian government complaint about residues of heavy metals (e.g. Pb, Cd) found in some Norwegian farmed salmons. It is good example of what can imply the customers' loss of trust for a specific local product having a strong power of image.

3. 'PREPARE' PREPARATION

After a general presentation of the 'PREPARE' project¹ structure, deliverables and deadlines, *Pascal Croûail* (CEPN) focus on the work package no3 on "Consumer contaminated goods"; then, the participants were invited to shortly present the opportunities and difficulties with the launching national stakeholder panels.

Switzerland (C. Murith): In Switzerland, the present regulatory framework (CRBN, RP, etc. ordinances) mostly deals with emergency aspects (especially evacuation and water supply). The post-accidental issues are not yet really taken into account: the Public Information Center (on the model of what has been proposed by the French post-accident preparedness and response committee – CODIRPA) will be tested at the occasion of one forthcoming drill; the 'zoning' will be also discussed at the cantonal level and countermeasures will be re-explored. Thus, it is proposed to invite neighbouring cantonal representative(s) in the French stakeholder panel. Depending on the needs, the Swiss participation could focus more on agricultural (e.g. Jura products in the Neuchâtel canton) or industrial (e.g. pharmaceuticals industry in the Basel canton) stakes. The food distributors could be also contacted, because they are mainly two in Switzerland (COOP and MIGROS).

France (S. Charron): In France, the reflection on foodstuff management in post-accident situation really started in 2005 in the framework of the 'post-accident preparedness and response steering committee' – the so-called CODIRPA (COMité DIRECTeur-Post-Accident). Its final report will be published soon on the ASN website. In parallel, an inter-gouvernemental plan for post-accident response (mainly focussing on emergency issues) is also under preparation. After the Fukushima accident, as abovementioned, IRSN has started an internal reflection on MPLs for foodstuff management in existing exposure situations. Altogether, these activities allow to identify most of the stakeholders and bodies that will be invited to participate to the French panel.

A. Rannou suggests to involve the Local Information Committees (CLIs)², which are in charge of the communication with the public around NPPs.

JF. Lecomte considers that it would be worthwhile that all national panels start their work with a common work basis taking into account notably the conclusions of the NERIS-ConGoo WG.

Ireland (C.McMahon): The EURANOS HPA food handbook will be the main basis of the Irish panel works. PREPARE is an opportunity for discussing the Irish customisation of the handbook

¹ *Objectives of the PREPARE Project (to be started in February 2013): EU and individual countries have developed systems of radiological protection after an accident with radiological consequences which affect the quality of foodstuff including drinking water, feedstuffs and more generally consumer goods. Recommendations or requirements already exist internationally (Codex Alimentarius, IAEA) and regionally (Euratom directives). However, after nuclear accidents (Chernobyl, Fukushima) and less serious radiological events, experience shows that the implementation of this system (based on criteria expressed as activity concentration) is not so easy and requires to develop adapted means. Although this system provides general guidance for the management of contaminated products, it does not prevent against stigmatisation and even rejection attitudes from consumers or retailers (anticipating the fears of consumers). Therefore, there is a need to further investigate the role of a quality system for the placement of foodstuffs on the market after a radiological event not only based on activity concentration.*

The overall objective of this Work Package is to contribute to the development of strategies, guidance and tools for the management of the contaminated products, taking into account the views of producers, processing and retail industries and consumers. It will help in designing and strengthening the preparedness plans for post-accidental situations at the national and local levels in European countries. It provides the opportunity to launch a common reflection for the establishment of a comprehensive adapted system to cope with the quality of product based on the principles of justification, optimisation and societal acceptance. Such a reflection should take into account the experience of several countries after the accidents of Chernobyl and Fukushima (in EU Member States and other countries) and ensure the involvement of relevant stakeholders.

² *Similar to 'Site Stakeholder Group' in the UK*

with wider stakeholder group. The group that customised the handbook (including the Food Safety and Sea Protection Agencies, the Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency) can draw on work done by universities representatives and radiation protection colleagues with a good past experience in stakeholder outreach and communication with the public, etc. The ‘starting point’ could be an accident in a NPP in the UK: the radiological risk awareness has increased since the Fukushima accident and it is a good occasion to discuss this issue with key stakeholders (such as farming representatives, food producers, and the public).

United Kingdom (T. Cabianca): In the UK, the PREPARE work will focus on non food issues, mainly because EURANOS, FARMING projects allow to reach a consensus with stakeholders for foodstuff management. However, overlapping with the EU SHIPSAN project³ should be avoided. PREPARE is an opportunity for improving the dialogue between the different UK regulatory bodies and other organizations whose work deals with the management of commodities (other than foodstuff) in crisis situation. The project could include a section on guidance values (criteria).

Note: It is asked to HPA to share with the other national panels the results of their work with stakeholders regarding foodstuff.

Norway (I.M. Eikermann): until now, work in this field mainly focus on the reindeer industry and the Sami people. PREPARE is an occasion to expand the work with other regions, which were not affected by the Chernobyl accident. However, it will be very important to maintain a local and national representativeness in the panels. The Norwegian fish industry is quite well receptive for this kind of problematic (since the heavy metal crisis) and the export-import stakes are of prior importance for it. (Note: the impact of a radioactive release in nordic seas could be an entry point to catch their interest). Contaminated goods and security is also an issue but could be taken into account in another and different stakeholder panel.

Greece (V. Kamanopoulou): Post-accidental (CRBN situations) preparedness has emerged in Greece during the preparation and securization of Athens 2004 Olympics. The Greek panel will use, as a ‘starting point’ an accident that occurred abroad and will probably focus its work on import-export issues. Stakeholders to be invited in priority are those involved in the commercialization of products, and its management at the governmental level, as well as shipping industry representatives. However, consumers and also representatives of the press and other media would be also necessary to involved in.

Belgium (G. Olyslaegers – absent the second day. Excerpt from the slide presentation:) There will be probably two stakeholder panels in Belgium. It is an opportunity to reactivate the FARMING and handbook networks. It has been considered quite difficult to discuss both food and other goods management issues in the same panel. SCK•CEN envisages to develop two specific inputs for the panels: - the empirical results of a survey on the acceptance of contaminated goods planned to be performed in 2013; - a media content analysis of reporting about contaminated food after the Fukushima accident.

There was nobody participating to the ConGoo meeting, and being also responsible for launching the PREPARE national panels in Portugal (ITN), Spain (CIEMAT), Finland (STUK), and the Netherlands (RIKILT).

³ The SHIPSAN project examines the prevention and control of Public Health threats to passengers and crew of cruise ships and ferries within the EU and provides the basis for the development of an integrated EU Ship Sanitation Program (www.eu-shipsan).

4. OUTPUTS AND FUTURE ISSUES

Thierry Schneider (NERIS Secretariat) summarizes the meeting pointing out the conceptual and more topical issues that should be further or deeper examined at the occasion of a second ‘ConGoo meeting’.

Conceptual Issues:

- ICRP conceptual framework (Existing vs. planned Exposure situation; Emergency vs. long term; Justification; Optimisation)
- Reference Levels and derived numerical values (and their rationale)
- Dilution and exemption/clearance aspects
- Harmonization between post-accident response national approaches in Europe (Harmonization of levels? Of strategies? Both?)
- Solidarity of non affected territories – coupled with ‘quality strategies – for guaranteeing the sustainable development of an affected territory
- Societal acceptance (definition of the food quality. Zero risk?)
- Comparison with non-radioactively (e.g. chemically) contaminated products
- Control and controllability (role and limits of the regulation in existing exposure situations)

Topical Issues

- Monitoring (type of monitoring according to products and goods, their origin, and radionuclides; WBC and environmental monitoring: devices needed)
- Crowdsourcing (information exchange and sharing through new media)
- Zoning strategies (When? Where? How long? Toward a graded approach in time and space? Which criteria?)
- The role of the ‘market’ (customer confidence, product image and quality)
- Communication and public information aspects (access to expertise and rationale understandings, transparency; FAQs after Fukushima)
- Feedback experiences and lessons learned (by people living in territories affected by radiological or chemical pollutants)
- Decontamination issues (non-food) and waste management problems
- Drinking water management in post-accidental situations
- Methodology for engaging stakeholders
- Transport issues

The participants agree to prepare a list of references from their own country that should be useful for the panels’ organizers in the other countries.

The principle for organizing a second ConGoo 1-2 day meeting is accepted. It might be at the occasion of the NERIS General Assembly in Spring 2013. It should focus on stakeholder experiences with the management of foodstuff and/or commodities in countries that have been affected by (radiological or chemical) accidents: Japan (Fukushima), Belarus (Chernobyl), etc.: the participants are invited to propose a shortlist of potential presentations and lecturers.

The date and location of the meeting will be sent by the NERIS secretariat to the NERIS Members and other participants to the EU PREPARE project, ASAP.

Agenda

DAY 1 (25 October 2012)

9:00 Welcome Coffee

9:30-09:40 Introduction of the NERIS ConGoo WG (*T.Schneider, CEPN-S.Charron, IRSN*)

09:40-10:00 Self-Presentation of Participants (*round table – max. 1' each*)

(Allocated times include discussions)

10:00-10:30 **IRSN Working Group on foodstuffs - Findings & Outputs** (*Jean-François Lecomte, IRSN, France*)

10:30-11:00 **OECD-NEA-CRPPH Expert Group on the Radiological Protection Aspects of the Fukushima Accident Sub-group on Trade in Commodities and Food – Draft Recommendations** (*Ted Lazo, OECD-NEA*)

11:00-11:30 *Pause*

11:30-12:00 → **Norwegian strategies towards permissible levels in foods and feed** (*Lavrans Skuterud, Inger Margarethe Eikermann, NRPA, Norway*)

12:00-12:30 → **Monitoring of radioactivity in goods, experience from Greece** (*Vassiliki Kamenopoulou, GAEC, Greece*)

12:30-13:00 → **Consumer issues and media reporting about radioactive contamination in the food chain** (*Geert Olyslaegers, SCK•CEN, Belgium*)

13:00-14:30 *Lunch*

14:30-15:00 → **Lessons learned in Ireland from non-radioactive contamination of foodstuffs (dioxins)** (*Ciara McMahon, RPII, Ireland*)

15:00-15:30 → **Contaminated goods (excluding foodstuff): Experience from the Netherlands** (*Chris Twenhofel, RIVM, The Netherlands*)

15:30-16:00 *Pause*

16:00-16:30 → **Issues and Regulatory Implications in dealing with Radioactively Contaminated Goods (excluding foodstuff) imported into the UK** (*Tiberio Cabianca, HPA, United Kingdom*)

16:30-17:00 → **Contaminated Goods: Experience from Switzerland** (*Christophe Murith, SFOPH, Switzerland*)

17:00- before 18:00 → General Open Discussion

Example of topics to be addressed (open!):

- ❖ Identification of strategic elements aiming at protecting the population and ensuring the product quality
- ❖ Role of reference levels, maximum permitted levels and other criteria for trade and local consumption, and their evolution with time in an existing exposure situation
- ❖ Assessment of internal dose associated with food and drinking water consumption, its surveillance and management at the local level; cross-border aspects, etc.
- ❖ Language elements regarding radiological quality of foodstuff for the population, information/communication aspects, development of the radiological protection culture
- ❖ Commodities - Goods other than foodstuff & feedstuff - specificities & lessons learned

DAY 2 (26 October 2012)

09:30 The European FP7-PREPARE⁴ Project: the “Consumer Goods” Work Package
(Pascal Croüail, CEPN, and Sylvie Charron, IRSN, France).

09:45 General discussion: the current situation (in Europe) with regard to the post-accident response preparedness and, the perspective of organizing national stakeholder panels on the management of contaminated consumer goods at the occasion of the PREPARE project (max 15'/country)

Participants to the NERIS ConGoo WG are expected to present the situation in their country: France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and UK

10:45-11:15 Coffee break

11:15-12:30 (Continuation of the abovementioned discussion)

12:30-14:00 Lunch

14:00-15:00 Synthesis of the meeting and next steps *(T.Schneider, CEPN, NERIS Secretariat, S. Charron, IRSN, France)*

15:00 → END OF THE MEETING

⁴ “Innovative integrative tools and platforms to be prepared for radiological emergencies and post-accident response in Europe”

NERIS Working Group on Contaminated Goods (ConGoo)

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