



# How to use decision support systems in a nuclear emergency?

NERIS Workshop Milano, 27. April 2015

<u>Wolfgang Raskob</u> Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)

Institute of Nuclear and Energy Technologies






KIT – University of the State of Baden-Württemberg and National Large-scale Research Center of the Helmholtz Association


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# Outline



- Phases of a nuclear accident, from the emergency management's point of view
- What a decision support system can deliver to decision making teams in case of a severe nuclear accident
- Discussion





# **Threat phase: source term estimation**



- Using in plant data
- FP5 project has resulted in two simulation tools,
  - one using a Bayesian net and pre-calculated source terms from PSA studies (STERPS)
  - One calculating the source term directly with a fast approximation of the complex processes (ASTRID)
- Both have been further developed and this development will continue in the EC project FASTNET
- STERPS was refined and is available as QPRO from GRS
  - Tested in German NPPs and with a direct link to RODOS
  - PSA level 2 source terms are needed and in plant data are used to define the probability of a pre-defined source term

# Threat phase: source term estimation II



- Source term estimation based on atmospheric dispersion calculations and gamma dose rate monitors (examples of many different approaches and projects)
  - Optimisation of atmospheric dispersion model inputs using inverse modelling of instantaneous or time-integrated gamma dose rate measurements (part of the project PREPARE, realised with DIPCOT)
  - Development of a software tool for simple and fast estimation of source term using gamma dose rate measurements at the fence (part of the project PREPARE, stand alone tool)
  - Use of Bayesian approaches to correct the content and extension of individual puffs from a dispersion plume (part of EURANOS, tested with RIMPUFF)

# Source term estimation III



- Is there a third possibility in combining both approaches?
- Step 1: estimation based on in-plant data
- Step 2: estimation by data assimilation from dispersion models and monitoring stations
- Step 3: refinement of the source term for the in-plant models
- Looping ....????


# Uncertainty



- What are main causes of uncertainty in results?
- How to deal with uncertainty in the models?
- How to communicate uncertainty to decision makers?

# **On-site and prognostic weather data - Example 1**






- Results for a NPP in hilly terrain in Germany
- Statistics of differences between numerical weather forecast and Neckarwestheim data for the first 11 hours of a 48 hour prognosis
- Statistical analysis period less than 3 months


# Comparison of station data with NWP data




 Standard source term, but weather data only from station near Fukushima (RODOS mit ATSTEP)



Monitoring total Cs




Calculations total Cs




#### **Ensemble calculations**



- Main source of uncertainty for atmospheric dispersion modelling is the input data (two key variables):
  - Source term: log-normal distribution is assigned to the source term since a deviation of an order of magnitude is considered to be equiprobable in both directions
  - Wind direction: normal distribution is assigned to the mean wind direction with a standard deviation of 30°








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#### **Proposed visualisation**






- Proposed visualisation of the impact of data uncertainties
- The area and location of the probability to exceed the dose threshold for sheltering is
- Decision makers have to decide which area is

### Late phase: Inhabited area modelling



- Improvement of ERMIN
  - Development of a wizard that facilitates the development of decontamination strategies
- As result, ERMIN-2 was developed
  - The wizard exists, which guides the user through the selection of measures based on the contributing surfaces
  - How to further develop the tool by integrating objectives such as costs or others in the strategy selection – beyond NERIS-TP



# Use of a DSS in the preparedness phase



- Possible areas for application
  - Strategy development with respect to ICRP 103
  - Planning of areas for countermeasures
  - Scenario preparation
  - Training
  - Others ....

## **New ICRP recommendations**




- Expand the simulation models for the new "residual dose" approach of ICRP-103
  - So far existing models treat countermeasures individually
  - The new recommendations requested that all exposure pathways should be taken into account in the countermeasure simulations
  - Strategies of individual measures should be possible
- As result, the ICRP model has been developed
  - Screening for individual measures or combinations including food
  - There is still the need to further develop such a model for operational use and in developing countermeasures strategies in a national regulatory framework

# Use of historic data for response



 Use historic or scenario data to perform decisions under uncertainty (use of knowledge data bases and CBR)



Maximum distance in which dose reference level for evacuation was exceeded for INES 7 source term and NPP Unterweser (Gering 2014, personal communication)


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# **Case-based reasoning (CBR)**



- CBR is a methodology to solve new problems by utilising knowledge of previously experienced problem situations
- CBR is a cycle process starting problem solving with identifying, assessing, and describing the current problem situation (case)
- Afterwards, similar historic cases from a case base should be determined to reuse their solutions and to adapt them to the current problem situation, if necessary
- The knowledge in the case base is updated by storing the new case with its possibly corrected or improved and confirmed solution
- Besides the previous cases, a CBR system includes similarity measures, and adaptation knowledge

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#### Knowledge database



- Requirement: Providing a structured storage facility for historic events and fictitious scenarios, their propagation with time and their applied (or applicable) emergency measures
- Objective: Supporting a fast assessment of a current event
- Means:
  - Defining attributes and attribute ranges to provide a unique representation
  - Taking into account decision-making factors and resulting effects
  - Taking into account accident phases and hence the status of the release, type and urgency of countermeasures, type and availability of resources, and relevance of exposure pathways

# Knowledge database II



- The knowledge database will contain historic cases and generic scenarios
- Scenarios will consider types of
  - Source terms (low to high)
  - Weather (with and without rain)
  - Environments (urban, rural)
  - Population density
- These scenarios will allow to define generic countermeasure scenarios which can be ranked according to preferences of the decision makers
- Ranking based on multi-criteria approaches

# **Complexity of a DSS**



- Each year, new features/ functionalities are added to the RODOS system
  - Simulation models
  - Reporting e.g. GIS results/compatibility
  - User interfaces
- Operability under all conditions is of highest interest by end user
- According to Bugzilla, mainly bug reports are listed for the emergency chain
- Question: is there a need to separate emergency models from late phase and complex simulation models?

# Conclusions



- DSSs are an important instrument for supporting the decision making team in all phases of an emergency – should be come more important in the preparedness phase
- Source term estimation is still a weak point in the chain and innovative ideas might be necessary
- Uncertainty handling is so far not an integral part of a DSS and work should be also directed towards the implementation but also the communication of uncertainties
- Use of the DSS to prepare strategies in advance is a valid option and with the new Analytical Platform tools will be provided to further evaluate results (Training/demonstration in October 2015 in Trnava)



# Thank you very much for your attention Questions?

# PREPARE: Training on the Analytical Platform in October 2015 in Trnava

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